The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann`s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology - purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones - connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary The author exemplifies the congruency of essential foundations between the critical realism of the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology (Gestalt theory) and Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology. For instance, this congruency manifests in the importance given to critical-realistic epistemology – purified from idealistic prejudices, not least prejudices such as production-theoretical ones – connected with an unconditional phenomenology. Altogether, it results in a shared critical distance from scholars of Brentano, such as Husserl and Meinong, as well as from Neo-Kantianism.

Summary In 1919 Nicolai Hartmann convincingly justified that there cannot exist a “general law of causation” as A. Meinong had in mind. For him Meinong’s understanding of causation was bound on the region of the physical layer of being, simultaneously postulating it as the only possible causation there. This is the starting point of the comparison between N. Hartmann‘s understanding of causation and that of the Gestalt Theory, for which neither in psychic nor in natural context linear-successive causality plays a (...) part. Therefore NH’s conception of 1919 was still completely incompatible with that of the Gestalt Theory despite the fact that he was distancing himself from the “general law of causation” sensu Meinong. 20 years later he changed this by adding the “Wechselwirkung” to the linear successive causation in the physical layer. In doing so he approached the Gestalt theoretical position but failed it insofar as for it his linear-successive understanding of causation generally has had its day with regard to natural processes, also consequently for the physical. Thus the term “causation“ had become free for a dynamic concept of causation which is equally appropriate for the physical and the psychic. NH makes this move not until 1949, shortly before his death, by writing:.... It is the opinion of the author of this work that the ingenious systematics of NH‘s Critical Ontology should make it possible to execute the necessary corrections in some details of his theory of layers without questioning the structure of his systematics, thus carrying out what NH was not able to do himself due to his death. (shrink)

Non-available common goods or: private non-availability of merit common goods The traditional emphasis on the individualistic concept of property stressed and analyzed by Locke and Kant led to a devaluation in philosophy and economy of traditionally usual forms of collective property, in particular of land, e. g., in form of the so-called "commons". Under the auspices of successful liberal and social market economy - though at times with the emphasis on "property obliges the owner" - private capitalism as the dominant (...) economy and a certain kind of value-neutral conception - and thus free availability - of nature consequently implied that the merit character of collective goods pertaining to nature and natural landscapes etc. was not taken seriously anymore New developments in jurisprudence and economy however show that even in principle a total private allocation of collective goods like the environment is neither possible nor meaningful, e. g. as regards the protection of the environment as an extremely important orientation at the common weal, in particular with respect to succeeding generations. In media coverage regarding environment problems, external effects and social traps should be taken into consideration regarding the aspect of a collective good including the necessary evaluation under common interests, i. e. the merit aspect should be more explicitly taken into account than hitherto. Das positive gesetzte Recht, in der Gesetzgebung festgelegt, ist weitgehend - zumindest was die Menschen- und Grundrechte angeht - von allgemeinen sittlichen Werten geprägt. So ist das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit ethischer Maßstab des positiven Rechts und findet als Gebot der Gleichbehandlung Eingang in die Verfassung. Ethische Normen werden soziokulturell relativ sanktioniert; es sind soziokulturell relative Aussagen, die jedoch mit dem Anspruch auf allgemeine Geltung und Verbindlichkeit formuliert werden. Auch das Recht als Teil der Kultur ist sozial konventionalisiertes Menschenprodukt, obgleich doch jeder einzelne davon geprägt ist. (shrink)

Machines will attain human levels of intelligence by the year 2040, predicts robotics expert Hans Moravec. And by 2050, they will have far surpassed us. In this mind-bending new book, Hans Moravec takes the reader on a roller coaster ride packed with such startling predictions. He tells us, for instance, that in the not-too-distant future, an army of robots will displace workers, causing massive, unprecedented unemployment. But then, says Moravec, a period of very comfortable existence will follow, as (...) humans benefit from a fully automated economy. And eventually, as machines evolve far beyond humanity, robots will supplant us. But if Moravec predicts the end of the domination by human beings, his is not a bleak vision. Far from railing against a future in which machines rule the world, Moravec embraces it, taking the startling view that intelligent robots will actually be our evolutionary heirs. "Intelligent machines, which will grow from us, learn our skills, and share our goals and values, can be viewed as children of our minds." And since they are our children, we will want them to outdistance us. In fact, in a bid for immortality, many of our descendants will choose to transform into "ex humans," as they upload themselves into advanced computers. We will become our children and live forever. In his provocative new book, the highly anticipated follow-up to his bestselling volume Mind Children, Moravec charts the trajectory of robotics in breathtaking detail. A must read for artificial intelligence, technology, and computer enthusiasts, Moravec's freewheeling but informed speculations present a future far different than we ever dared imagine. (shrink)

This book shows that classic Chinese philosophy is as rational as Western approaches dealing with the problems of logic, epistemology, language analysis, and linguistic topics from a philosophical point of view. It presents detailed analyses of rational and methodological features in Confucianism, Taoist philosophy, and the School of Names as well as Mohist approaches in classical Chinese philosophy, especially in regard to ideas of valid knowledge. The authors also provide new arguments against cultural relativism and antirational movements like religious fundamentalism (...) that do not pay due attention to what all human beings have in common-- to cultural universals. (shrink)

Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, there (...) is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level. (shrink)

Summary Interpretari necesse est (Interpretation is necessary). This slogan is summarizing the methodological and epistemological essay concentrating on what can be called a transcendental interpretationism and a methodological interpretationism. This approach is combining a pragmatic interpretive approach with a constitutional quasi Kantian but more pluralistic and flexible epistemology. It takes up the assets of Nietzsches radical interpretationism without ending up in an interpretationist idealism. Though a basic fundamental insight is a statement of the interpretation-impragnatedness of any knowledge and experience whatsoever, (...) there is nevertheless a possibility to combine a kind of critical realism with this interpretationist approach. Though we are always obliged to use interpretation-dependent epistemological schemata and concepts as well as theories (we have no non-interpretive concepts, theories and ways of gaining and constructing knowledge), we have still, for practical reasons, to presuppose an external independent world which can however only be described in interpretation-dependent terms. Even this epistemological model is certainly an interpretive one. If we distinguish between different levels of more or less variable interpretations (we cannot, by our very biological constitution, change primary interpretations built in to our biological constitution and make-up of sense-organs etc.), we can analyse and define truth as a relation between different levels and types of interpretations. The ideal of truth makes some sense of a concept of correspondence, though in the last analysis it is a combination of coherence-theoretical and pragmatic-constructivist ideas. — The model of an epistemological interpretationism has the advantage (by contradistinction, e.g., with critical rationalism) to be consistently applied to itself: The interpretive epistemology is certainly but an interpretational model itself. — The sketched interpretationism has certain similarities with Nelson Goodman's constructive interpretive pluralism and Hilary Putnam's internal realism, although there are slight, but decisive differences to be carefully observed. The differences have to do with the mentioned practical realism and the presupposition of one world in which we live. The similarities are greater with respect to internal realism. A decisive difference is only that you cannot, according to methodological and transcendental interpretationism, compel somebody towards the uniqueness of language use. There are always degrees of freedom and variation to change the usage of signs. There is no socially intended uniqueness and compulsory usage of signs and their meanings. Even within the language community the rules are always only conventionally realized and actualized. There is no real correspondence between signs and signs (or interpretive constructs, for that matter). Any correspondence whatsoever can only refer to interpretational constructs itself. Any classification, verification, selection and identification of facts, even any thinking of data and facts as such is in the last analysis dependent on interpretations. Even the conception of an epistemological subject is but an interpretational construct on a higher level. (shrink)

For the past several decades, philosophers of science such as Hacking and Giere, instead of focusing attention on scientific theories and seeing them as just linguistic entities, have been thinking about philosophy of science from the standpoint of experimental manipulation and model-construction. Both Hacking’sexperimentalism and Giere’s modelism have played a great part in giving birth to an action-oriented and technology-shaped philosophy of science. In this paper, it is argued that philosophy of science can benefit from the technological approach and correlatively, (...) the methodology of general technology might profit from taking into consideration the refinements and novel developments of philosophy of science. It is argued, besides, not only that different methodological approaches have to be integrated into a rather general theory of scheme-interpretation, but also that action-“grasping”-knowledge is shaped by interpretations and by perspectives. (shrink)

Goldman (1971) analyzed interrelations between act-statements by inducing a structure by means of the relationship by, e.g.: "He turned on the light by flipping the switch." Generally, the structure is represented by act-diagrams, e.g. act-trees. In the present article the mathematical theory of directed graphs (digraphs), specifically the concepts of partially or strictly ordered sets, graph-theoretical trees, semi-lattices etc. are shown to be applicable and conducive to the formal and a more general description of networks of act statements generated by (...) a (relative) basic actionstatement and by the relation by. The well-known problem of identity of acts described by corresponding statements connected by by is differentiated by introducing the graph-theoretical equivalence relation of belonging to the same-graph {graph-sameness or graph-identity) admitting of a more refined classification and logical description of the interdependence of actions, acttypes, act-properties etc. (shrink)

Any kind of knowledge, cognition, perception, and action is necessarily shaped by activation of "schemata". Any interpretation is schema activation. Schemata are epistemologically speaking "structural" activation patterns which are psychologically and neurologically speaking accommodated, adapted, "learned" by activating neuronal assemblies. Six levels of interpretative schema activations are outlined from invariable primary "interpretations" through conventional, classificatory and justificatory as well as meta-interpretations. Constitutive schema interpretations are unavoidable. Many philosophical problems will have to be reformulated or reinterpreted along these lines.

[Man as a Metasymbolic and Superinterpretative Being.].

An epistemology mainly oriented at a philosophical discussion of natural sciences and technology is sketched out on the basis of the author’s “methodological scheme-interpretationism” combining a realistic and a perspectival pragmatic approach. - In the main part, 12 characteristic features of the New Technologies are presented and discussed as, e.g., operationalization, computerization, models and modularity, virtuality and artificiality, interdisciplinary interaction, comprehensive and complex systems, telematization and remote control, robotics and AI technology and automatization as well as “socio-eco-techno-systems”, technology-driven globalization and (...) the respective problems of individual and social responsibility. - Also, actual trends are listed and future tasks for the international ecological cooperation of states, UN and UNESCO bodies under urgent guidelines of humanitarian values and “practical/concrete humanity” are recommended. (shrink)

The paper discusses Giere’s perspectivism in philosophy of science. Giere is certainly right in judging that, even within perspectives, the strongest possible conclusion is that some model provides a good but never perfect fit to aspects of the world, but its agency-laden “modelism” and realistic instrumentalism should be extended to a comprehensive general perspectivist and “indirect” realistic epistemology and embed it in an anthropology proper of the man as “flexible multiple human being”. Scheme-interpretations and specific perspectives are necessary for any (...) cognition in any science—natural and social, but also for everyday conceptions, modeling and practical acting as well as in philosophy and philosophy of science. (shrink)

[Was Kant a methodological-epistemological interpretationist?].

The Proceedings of the Karlsruhe Academic Session of the International Academy of the Philosophy of the Sciences cover the topic of philosophy of technology. Half a dozen of other pertinent topical papers have been added in order to extend the topics dealt with and to reach a rather comprehensive overview of this multi-ramified field. Nowadays philosophy of technology is not only confronted with new, anthropological and social as well as political problems to deal with, but also with methodological problems of (...) the mutual interactions between science and technology, with problems of reliability and viability of technology assessment, e. g. with risks, environmental and social impact assessments. The importance and necessity of a philosophy and a practice-oriented ethics of technology will drastically rise and grow in the near future. (shrink)

In ‘belief revision’ a theory\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. Typically, \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document}, one has to give up belief in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\neg\varphi$$\end{document} by a process (...) of retraction, and φ is in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}\ast\varphi$$\end{document}. We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\cal K}$$\end{document} wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$B\neg\varphi$$\end{document} is true. The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

Nash is famous for many inventions, but it is less known that he, simultaneously with Marschak, also was the first to axiomatize expected utility for risk. In particular, these authors were the first to state the independence condition, a condition that should have been but was not stated by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Marschak’s paper resulted from interactions with several people at the Cowles Commission. We document unique letters and personal communications with Nash, Samuelson, Arrow, Dalkey, and others, making plausible (...) that Nash made his discovery independently from the others. (shrink)

Current interpretations of the concept of theory by philosophers of science of different orientations are sketched out, in particular the traditional statement view (theories as systems of statements) and the formal axiomatic interpretation (theories as calculi) as well as the historical or historicist interpretation of theories as series of successive research programs or paradigms etc. (theory dynamics). In addition, the model-theoretical nonstatement view (the so-called structuralist interpretation) of theories is roughly delineated and discussed as regards the status and interpretation of (...) theoretical (T-theoretical) concepts. Finally, technological and action-theoretical approaches defining the model-theoretic view are presented as particularly apt for a methodology of technology.A number of recommendations are developed from this, particularly the idea of satisficing in construction theory and the methodological idea of optimum fit instead of approximation to truth.The interplay between action, experiment and gaining knowledge is highlighted from a methodological and schema-interpretationist perspective. This approach seems to be conducive to a methodology and epistemology of engineering sciences, in particular construction theory and design theory. (shrink)

Grasping Reality addresses the methodology of a sophisticated realistic approach to scientific as well as everyday recognition by using schemes and interpretive constructs to analyze theories and the practice of recognition from a hypothesis-realistic vantage point. An appendix provides an overview regarding a realistic and pragmatic philosophy of technology, including the so-called new information technologies.

Goldman (1971) analyzed interrelations between act-statements by inducing a structure by means of the relationship by, e.g.: "He turned on the light by flipping the switch." Generally, the structure is represented by act-diagrams, e.g. act-trees. In the present article the mathematical theory of directed graphs (digraphs), specifically the concepts of partially or strictly ordered sets, graph-theoretical trees, semi-lattices etc. are shown to be applicable and conducive to the formal and a more general description of networks of act statements generated by (...) a (relative) basic actionstatement and by the relation by. The well-known problem of identity of acts described by corresponding statements connected by by is differentiated by introducing the graph-theoretical equivalence relation of belonging to the same-graph {graph-sameness or graph-identity) admitting of a more refined classification and logical description of the interdependence of actions, acttypes, act-properties etc. (shrink)

Non-available common goods or: private non-availability of merit common goods The traditional emphasis on the individualistic concept of property stressed and analyzed by Locke and Kant led to a devaluation in philosophy and economy of traditionally usual forms of collective property, in particular of land, e. g., in form of the so-called "commons". Under the auspices of successful liberal and social market economy - though at times with the emphasis on "property obliges the owner" - private capitalism as the dominant (...) economy and a certain kind of value-neutral conception - and thus free availability - of nature consequently implied that the merit character of collective goods pertaining to nature and natural landscapes etc. was not taken seriously anymore (including the common interest in avoiding depletion, deterioration, erosion, pollution etc.) New developments in jurisprudence and economy however show that even in principle a total private allocation of collective goods like the environment is neither possible nor meaningful, e. g. as regards the protection of the environment as an extremely important orientation at the common weal, in particular with respect to succeeding generations. In media coverage regarding environment problems, external effects and social traps should be taken into consideration regarding the aspect of a collective good including the necessary evaluation under common interests, i. e. the merit aspect should be more explicitly taken into account than hitherto. Das positive gesetzte Recht, in der Gesetzgebung festgelegt, ist weitgehend - zumindest was die Menschen- und Grundrechte angeht - von allgemeinen sittlichen Werten geprägt (Zweckmäßigkeitsüberlegungen sind eher bei der Spezialgesetzgebung einschlägig). So ist das Prinzip der Gerechtigkeit ethischer Maßstab des positiven Rechts und findet als Gebot der Gleichbehandlung Eingang in die Verfassung (z.B. Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Art. 3). Ethische Normen werden soziokulturell relativ sanktioniert; es sind soziokulturell relative Aussagen, die jedoch mit dem Anspruch auf allgemeine Geltung und Verbindlichkeit formuliert werden. Auch das Recht als Teil der Kultur ist sozial konventionalisiertes Menschenprodukt, obgleich doch jeder einzelne davon (mit)geprägt ist. (shrink)

Values are essentially interpretive: they can, even must be interpreted and can and should be understood as (somehow socially or personally standardized) interpretive constructs of a specific kind and according to different types to be distinguished and classified within an hierarchical typology. There is a special connection between values and actions as well as their characteristic of being related to their ascription to persons, goods, events etc. This connection is indeed covered, borne or carried out by interpretation. In fact, any (...) ascription of a value concept or predicate whatsoever is dependent on a structure and hierarchy of normative and in part descriptive schemes of at times conventional and dispositional scheme-interpretations. Generally speaking, the thesis is that the methodological model of interpretive constructs (scheme-interpretationism) can be thoroughly applied to the concept and usage of values. Social values are then in this sense socially originated, institutionally sanctioned or standardized interpretational constructs of a social character, notably for social comparisons in using and establishing preferences for a kind of (limited) uniformity and expectability and predictability of social behavior and actions. (shrink)

Values are essentially interpretive: they can, even must be interpreted and can and should be understood as (somehow socially or personally standardized) interpretive constructs of a specific kind and according to different types to be distinguished and classified within an hierarchical typology. There is a special connection between values and actions as well as their characteristic of being related to their ascription to persons, goods, events etc. This connection is indeed covered, borne or carried out by interpretation. In fact, any (...) ascription of a value concept or predicate whatsoever is dependent on a structure and hierarchy of normative and in part descriptive schemes of at times conventional and dispositional scheme-interpretations. Generally speaking, the thesis is that the methodological model of interpretive constructs (scheme-interpretationism) can be thoroughly applied to the concept and usage of values. Social values are then in this sense socially originated, institutionally sanctioned or standardized interpretational constructs of a social character, notably for social comparisons in using and establishing preferences for a kind of (limited) uniformity and expectability and predictability of social behavior and actions. (shrink)

Any sort of cognition, perception, and action is necessarily shaped by (re)activation of “schemata.” Any interpretation is schema (re)activation. Schemata are epistemologically speaking “structural” activation patterns which are psychologically and neurologically speaking accommodated, adapted, “learned” by co- and re-activating neuronal assemblies. Six levels of interpretative schema activations (schema interpretations) are outlined from invariable primary “interpretations” through conventional, classificatory, and justificatory, as well as meta-interpretations. Constitutive schema interpretations are unavoidable. Many philosophical problems will have to be reformulated or reinterpreted along these (...) lines, e.g., a sort of moderated pragmatic (interpretational) realism in epistemology. (shrink)

Reflective transcending is essential for any creative philosophizing. What I mean by this is the creative transcending of limits and boundaries such as, e.g., borders of classes, any sets or delimitations. Conceptual dimensions within a specific level or stratum in comparing of different species is one thing, the transcending of levels and ascending to a higher one is another matter. Such a semantic or level ascent is often a hallmark of creativity – according to some classical philosophers mentioned in the (...) paper. In general, one should, once again, hold the creative ascent to meta-levels in philosophy in higher esteem! (shrink)

The new so-called pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation. Causal explanations are excluded from the debate. Instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation. The paper criticizes this restrictive approach for methodological and terminological reasons without denying the importance of epistemic, pragmatic considerations. In addition, the respective traditional thesis on the logical-structural identity of prediction and explanation and the (...) new epistemic turn with respect to this thesis are criticized. The latter seems to lead to confrontations between every day and scientific explanations. The epistemic liberalisation of terminology and methodology certainly admits of new forms of systematization, e. g. potential prediction, but a general theory of systematization should not be too restrictive and should at the same time retain the classical distinction between epistemic and genuine lawful explanations. (shrink)

The new so-called pragmatic-epistemic approach to the methodology of explanation seems to dispense with the difference between traditional epistemic reasoning and genuine explanation. Causal explanations are excluded from the debate. Instead, the degree and value of subjective conviction seems to be the decisive factor for explanation. The paper criticizes this restrictive approach for methodological and terminological reasons without denying the importance of epistemic, pragmatic considerations. In addition, the respective traditional thesis on the logical-structural identity of prediction and explanation and the (...) new epistemic turn with respect to this thesis are criticized. The latter seems to lead to confrontations between every day and scientific explanations. The epistemic liberalisation of terminology and methodology certainly admits of new forms of systematization, e.g. potential prediction, but a general theory of systematization should not be too restrictive and should at the same time retain the classical distinction between epistemic and genuine lawful explanations. (shrink)

This paper begins with an overview of the origins and development of ancient direct participatory “democracy” and a related concept of the “public.” Through the Roman “res publica” and the “homo publicus” and much later the Magna Carta and the English tradition of participatory rights, as well as the French “division of powers” and the French Revolution and Kant’s “public usage of reason,” a rather modern concept of the “public” in representative modern democracies developed in the Enlightenment and materialized in (...) the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In social and political philosophy there was a noticeable impact of “the public” and “public life” in debates, formal constitutions and their philosophical and pragmatic foundations. Dewey’s lectures on “The Public and its Problems” already emphasized the impact and the growth of communication technologies for “the public,” publicity, political and social life. Habermas diagnosed a “Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” from a pragmatic social philosophical point of view, although he did not really take up Dewey’s diagnoses and predictions of the role of media and communication technologies. The same is true for Gerhardt’s study The Public: The Political Form of Consciousness (2012). With the pervasive impact of digital communication and media technologies there has occurred another structural transformation of the public sphere and the concept of the public. Instant global multimedia communication certainly has largely positive effects, fostering social as well as individal freedom and even revolutionary changes. But there are also the widespread experiences of individual and group mobbing, “shitstorms,” cyber-crimes, electronic spying and data-mining, etc. The structure (the concept and reality) of the public has lately been and is currently rapidly changing again—due to the electronic information revolution. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory is a pertinent example of a framework that has been stretched over many conceptual contexts and that has been applied to a wide variety of empirical phenomena. A pressing issue involves the scope of application of stakeholder theory, however, because it is not a comprehensive ethical scheme or problem-solving algorithm. We begin our search for the boundaries of stakeholder management by identifying a presently under-acknowledged yet major underlying assumption, notably that the approach is rooted in voluntary action and (...) association. Building on this presumption, we argue that firm - stakeholder relationships are best to be understood in contractualist terms; i.e. as voluntary arrangements between two or more parties seeking mutual benefit. This assertion subsequently allows us to identify three boundary conditions applying to stakeholder theory: (1) the parties should be sufficiently autonomous; (2) their interests need to be alignable; and (3) they should be capable of living up to their commitments. We substantiate these criteria with evidence from a collective case study of buyer - supplier relationships in the Dutch manufacturing sector, demonstrating that the stakeholder management model fails when these boundary criteria are violated. (shrink)